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GLOBALIZATION AND GENOCIDALISM:
Fictional Discourse Without Borders
(For Fun and Profit)
In this essay we explore the relationship between globalization and genocidalism.
“Globalization” is understood as “freedom and ability of individuals and firms to initiate
voluntary economic transactions with residents of other countries,” while “genocidalism”
is defined as “(i) the purposeful neglect to attribute responsibility for genocide in cases
when overwhelming evidence exists, and as (ii) the energetic attributions of “genocide” in
less then clear cases without considering available and convincing opposing evidence and
argumentation.”
The hypothesis that we defend here as explanatory of globalization’s “surprising”
failure to live up to its often repeated theoretical promise that it is not a “zero-sum game,”
is that this apparent failure is a result of the impact of the sole super-power’s global
politics. These policies are manifested through an open onslaught on the notion of state
sovereignty (impacting the sovereignty of virtually all countries except that of the U.S.),
and an aggressive promotion of all kinds of interventionism, in particular armed (“humanitarian”) intervention. The nexus between the two is to a significant degree provided by
the social phenomenon (characteristic only of the West, since, for example, Mozambique
does not go on talking about alleged genocide in, say, Northern Ireland) we call “genocidalism”. Genocidalism manifests itself as a tool of globalization that is ever more morphing into a sort of imperialism and neo-colonialism, and is indeed becoming something of a
remarkably effective judicial Trojan horse.
It looks to us that globalization is the globalization of US sovereignty, i.e., its
extension over as much foreign territory as possible. Interestingly, genocidalism is a means
to that end, and one that is more effective than, say, weapons of mass destruction, or even
“terrorism” as a tool. Genocidalism is so effective that it bars the inherent right to selfdefense against aggression, and obviates the sovereignty of the targeted state. Genocidalism can even be employed to actually make states vanish, in what can only be called
republicide. Such was the fate of Yugoslavia. The other historical example we use to illustrate our points consist of the events in Rwanda of 1994.
KEY WORDS: Globalization, genocide, genocidalism, aggression, international law,
criminal international tribunals, Yugoslavia, Rwanda.

The hypothesis that we wish to propose as explanatory of globalization’s “surprising” failure to live up to its often repeated theoretical promise that it is not a
“zero-sum game,” is that this apparent failure is a result of the impact of the sole
super-power’s global politics on the global economy. These policies are manifested
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through an open onslaught on the notion of state sovereignty (impacting the sovereignty of virtually all countries except that of the U.S.), and an aggressive promotion of all kinds of interventionism, in particular armed (“humanitarian”) intervention. The nexus between the two is to a significant degree provided by the social
phenomenon (characteristic of the West) we call “genocidalism”. Genocidalism
manifests itself as a tool of globalization (increased openness, or as we shall see,
“openness,” and decreased state sovereignty) that is ever more morphing into a sort
of imperialism and neo-colonialism, and is indeed becoming something of a
remarkably effective judicial Trojan horse.

1. Globalization
We are urging that globalization and genocidalism be considered together. As
the effects of globalization are not exclusively economic in nature, so, too, are
genocidalism’s effects not restricted to the realm of sociology or academia. Both
phenomena have real consequences—many of which are debilitating for vulnerable
groups—and both heavily rely on a discourse of faith and belief, and seem impervious to epistemological requirements, while portraying themselves, paradoxically,
as highly serious, and essentially moral endeavors. In both cases, it appears that the
intensity of the faith in the high morality of the actions carried out—towards
foreigners, in foreign countries, and practically always, in the prevailing discourse,
for foreign interests, and therefore not (or so little) in the interests of the practitioners—insulates the practice from well-deserved scrutiny, and indeed, serious critique.1
Let us introduce the concept of genocidalism. “Genocidalism” is (stipulatively) defined as follows: (i) The purposeful neglect to attribute responsibility for
genocide in cases when overwhelming evidence exists, and as (ii) the energetic
attributions of “genocide” in less then clear cases without considering available and
convincing opposing evidence and argumentation. We may call the first manifestation “genocidalism of omission,” while the second represents the genocidal use of
the word “genocide” or “genocidalism of commission.”2 If we were to explore the
relationship between the two manifestations of genocidalism we would find out
that the latter often functions in the way that strengthens the former. Namely, the
outcome of a genocidal use of “genocide” may lead to omission of attributing appropriate responsibility for genocide in some related cases. However, in this paper
we want to focus on clarifying as much as possible the connection between the
genocidal use of “genocide” and the process of globalization. The former enables,
justifies, and in some cases forcefully advocates various forms of intervention,
–––––––––––––

1
For an argument that in favor of such scrutiny in the form of constructing an ethics of
international activism, see Aleksandar Jokic “Activism, Language, and International Law,”
International Journal for the Semiotic of Law 15 (2002): 107-120.
2
A detailed analysis of the concept of genocidalism and the associated social phenomenon
is offered in Aleksandar Jokic, “Genocidalism,” The Journal of Ethics 8, No. 3 (2004): 251-297
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including military, while the latter can spread faster if all kinds of interventionism
are maximally facilitated.
Interestingly, genocidalism and globalization are co-occurring phenomena.
Both are spreading at a faster pace in the post-Cold War period. However, while
genocidalism is quintessentially a Western phenomenon (e.g., Mozambique does
not go on talking about alleged genocide in, say, Northern Ireland) globalization in
the economic sense of the word affects virtually all countries. Where genocidalism
and globalization coincide is in their effect on diminishing sovereignty in general
and that of weak and poor countries in particular.3 It is often argued, referring to
international trade theory, that globalization is not a zero sum game; that is everyone benefits from the spread of globalization. Also, openness and foreign direct
investment (FDI) should theoretically make income distribution more equal in poor
or less developed countries (LDS) and less equal in rich or developed countries
(DC).4 The empirical figures show, however, that benefits are grossly unequally
distributed: the rich and powerful benefit an enormous amount from the process
while the weak and poor benefit (if at all) negligently by comparison (though these
findings don’t go uncontested by economists who do research residing in the Western world). The fact that genocidalism (as an instrument of globalization) appears
to be a tool for weakening sovereignty, spreading interventionism, and increase of
the obscene disparity in distribution of benefits globally, may fuel concerns, for
many, that globalization is nothing more than simply neo-colonialism gone rampant.
The official World Bank definition of globalization is: “Freedom and ability of
individuals and firms to initiate voluntary economic transactions with residents of
other countries.” In real life globalization translates into greater mobility of the
factors of production (capital and labor) and greater world integration through
increased trade and foreign investments. The degree of mobility of labor and capi–––––––––––––
3

This is why we would agree with the converse claim in Omar Dahbour “Three Models of
Global Community,” The Journal of Ethics 9, no. 1-2 (2005): 201-24. Dahbour argues that only
self-sustaining communities that embody some robust notion of sovereignty can adequately
protect communities facing the threats posed by the globalizing tendencies of capital.
4
For arguments and discussion of why, in theory, globalization should have the effect of
bringing down the income inequality within the LCDs see, for example, Richard B. Freeman,
“Are your Wages Set in Beijing?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 9 (Summer 1995),
No.3, pp. 15-32; Adrian Wood, North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality: Changing
Fortunes in a Skill-Driven World (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994); and Adrian Wood, “How
trade Hurt Unskilled Workers,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 9 (Summer 1995), No.
3, pp 57-80. Roughly, the theoretical reason for this expectation is as follows. The DCs have an
advantage in skill-intensive products and tend to export these while LDCs tend to export lowskill intensive products (because low-skill labor is their abundant factor and its price will
therefore be low). Given the low price foreign investors will tend to invest in low-skill intensive
processes. This should make income distribution in DCs more unequal while the income
inequality in LDCs should go down. Empirical findings, however, do not reflect these theoretical expectations.
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tal depends on the openness of the countries around the globe (i.e., openness, while
it often diminishes state sovereignty, is a necessary condition for this mobility,
which is the essence of globalization). In fact, globalization is reflected in two
variables: openness—share of combined exports and imports in GDP—and the
share of FDI in GDP of the recipient country. In order for globalization, therefore,
to be judged positively (to be called “globally good” in some meaningful way) we
should be able to ascertain two facts from the perspective of LDCs: (i) the income
inequality within the LDCs should go down, and (ii) the relationship between FDI
and economic growth within the recipient country should be positive. Taken
together the condition (i), which we may call “greater income equality principle,”
and (ii), which we may call “FDI recipient positive growth principle” add up to
something not unlike John Rawls’s second principle of his criterion of justice if
attempted to be applied globally5:
Second Principle: “Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity [the opportunity principle]; and second, they
are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society [the
difference principle]”6
However, there is evidence, though still a matter of controversy, that neither of
our conditions is satisfied. While, theoretically, the increased trade and foreign
investment (openness) should make income distribution more equal in poor countries and less equal in rich countries empirical findings prove otherwise. The
evidence suggests that at very low average income level, it is the rich who benefit
from openness. In fact, openness (combined share of exports and imports in country’s GDP) in very poor countries might increase inequality by helping those with
basic education, and leaving even further behind those with no education.7 Thus,
the effect of globalization (openness) on a country’s income distribution depends
on country’s initial income level; that is, before income level rises for many LDCs
openness cannot translate into a more equitable income distribution. But, how will
the increase in income level be achieved? Perhaps it can increase through FDI?
So what is the relationship between FDI and economic growth? As with the
impact of openness on income distribution the answer to this question remains controversial, though the question has received a great deal of attention from econo–––––––––––––

5
We are hereby not suggesting that this should be done. In fact, we find objectionable the
pet project of conceptualizing global economic justice, often carried out in terms of some notion
of “human rights,” that is so dear to many upholders of “cosmopolitanism.” See, for example,
Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1979); Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Ian
Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer (eds.), Global Justice (New York: New York University Press,
1999); Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human rights (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); and
Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven: Yale University Pres, 2002).
6
John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press 1993), p. 6.
7
See again Wood (1994).
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mists in recent decades. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is described by the World
Bank as “investment made to acquire a lasting management interest in an enterprise
operating in a country other than that of the investor.” Typically, FDIs are made by
large multinational corporations through mergers or acquisition, or through the
construction of a new facility. There is no question that since the debtors’ crisis of
the early 1980s, when a number of developing countries defaulted on their loans,
FDI became a popular (and more apparently viable) option through which LDCs
could attract capital through policies and incentives such as tax breaks. But what
does increase in FDI mean for a country’s growth? If it doesn’t mean much, that is,
if FDI has no effect on growth in the recipient countries or FDI clearly benefits
only the country from which FDI originates, then there is no justifiable reason specific government policies should aim to attract FDI as a source of capital for LDCs.
Let us not underestimate the impact of FDI in the last two decades when FDI has
become the largest capital flow to LDCs, surpassing by far portfolio equity investment, private loans, and official “development assistance”.8 But who benefits?
Economists are all over on this one in their interpretation of data; while some see
the data as indicating that FDI is a significant factor in economic growth9 others
find that FDI benefits the country from which FDI originates, not the recipient
country10. Given the nature of the agents that are the primary sources of FDI, namely the multinational companies, we would not be surprised that the latter is in
fact the case. Be that as it may, we cannot here ascertain that there is positive relationship between FDI and economic growth within the recipient country. Therefore, our condition (ii) isn’t satisfied either.
We have observed here a surprising double failure. Neither is it the case, under
the conditions of rapidly expanding globalization (openness) that (i) the income
inequality within the LDCs goes down, nor that (ii) the relationship between FDI
and economic growth within the recipient country is positive. This is surprising
given, on the one hand, the theory based expectation that greater openness should
foster more equitable income distribution in LDCs, and given the practice of governments in LDCs actively courting FDI through tax and other incentives, on the
other. Assuming that it stands to reason that empirical data should really be in line
with theoretical expectation and specific governments’ practices we may want to
ask what could be the factors that are responsible for thwarting these natural theoretical expectations and governmental practices. This is where we come to our
–––––––––––––
8

See Dwight Perkins, Economics of Development (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
2001); and World Bank, Global Development Finance (Washington, D. C.: World Bank, 2002).
9
See for example, De Gregorio E. Borensztein, J. and J-W. Lee, “How Does Foreign
Direct Investment Affect Economic Growth?” Journal of International Economics 45 (1998),
115-135.
10
De la Potterie B. Van Pottellsberghe, “Does Foreign Direct Investment Transfer Technology Across Borders?” Review of Economics and Statistics 83 (2001), 490-497.
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second topic in this paper: genocidalism.11

2. Genocidalism
2.1 Genocidalism as a social phenomenon
The genocidal use of “genocide” is a more widespread phenomenon in the
contemporary discourse on international affairs than one might initially think. The
parties guilty of genocidalism can be found in a broad range of partakers in this
discourse among journalists, human rights activists, celebrities, politicians, international law experts, and other academics such as psychologists, historians or political scientists. While genocide is undoubtedly the highest crime of which humans
are capable, quite a bit of harm can be achieved by morally irresponsible uses of
the word “genocide”.
In this respect perhaps the saddest and possibly most dangerous form of genocidalist activity resides in (what poses as) academic scholarship. For, academics are
by way of their training uniquely positioned to provide credence to this malignant
intellectual attitude and pursuits that genocidalism represents. Academics have the
skills and prestige needed to successfully package propaganda to appear as scholarship, emotions as good reasons, dogmatic belief as well supported claims, and
prejudice, bigotry, and even racism as respectable viewpoints. They can turn lies
into truth (or “truth”), fiction into fact, sick imagination into historical events, total
ideological blindness into insights of a visionary, and, last but not least, they can
turn apologia into veritable art form. However, academics are just one group in the
larger community of genocidalism peddlers. In fact, in order for it to be effective
this practice cannot be done in isolation. We must, therefore, learn to appreciate the
importance of the point that in order for genocidalism to manifest itself as a social
force, and inflict real damage on its targets, a relatively tightly knit network of
players supporting each other’s endeavors is needed.

2.2 Genocidalism as a deliberate epistemic failure
The key to understanding genocidalism—and indeed, many other forms of
fanaticism—is the identification of an inherent ingredient of the discourse, that
may be called the attitude of ideologically based epistemic arrogance (for short,
ideological arrogance). This epistemic failure, while easy to detect and reject when
–––––––––––––
11

This essay is a result of extensive revision and substantial expansion of the article by
Aleksandar Jokic “Globalizing World and Genocidalism” prepared for the 8th International
Roundtables for the Semiotics of Law: “Signs of the World: Interculturality and Globalization,”
held in Lyon, France, non July 7-12, 2004. This coauthored assay also draws, in section 2, on
Aleksandar Jokic, “Genocidalism” The Journal of Ethics 8 (2004), pp.251-297; and, in section
3.3, in part on Tiphaine Dickson and Aleksandar Jokic, “Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No
Evil: The Unsightly Milosevic Case” forthcoming in the International Journal for the Semiotics
of Law Vol. 19 (2006).
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analyzing issues at home, seems to function with effortless impunity when it is
applied to events abroad. Foreign markets, in particular in poor or developing
regions of the world, attract predatory financial and economic practices; similarly,
in the marketplace of ideas, these far-flung locales are the frequent settings for
bafflingly effective displays of mendacity and contortions of logic. We shall introduce this phenomenon by way of an example.
Consider a report entitled “Journalist admits lying to the viewers” published by
a web-based news outlet theaustralian.news.com on February 28, 2002. The story
is about a veteran 60 Minutes reporter, Richard Carleton, who admitted he had
misled, and lied to viewers by showing footage from another massacre site to
illustrate a story about the alleged massacre of Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite this admission, however, Mr. Carleton denied he had behaved unethically as a journalist and said, “the footage had enhanced viewers’ understanding of
the 1995 massacre of Muslim residents by Bosnian Serbs.” One may wonder at this
point how lies can serve the purpose of enhancing anybody’s understanding of
anything. But more importantly, we could ask what exactly is this understanding?
It is the conviction that one “got it right,” and in this case it is Mr. Carleton’s conviction that the Serbs are the villains as far as the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was concerned, and spreading that conviction by any means possible must
be just fine. The Carleton-like attitude that the job is “enhancement of understanding” or “education of the audience” that is accompanied with utter disregard for
true representation fails the epistemic reliability requirement for owing respect to a
position held by such persons.12 All we have here is evidence that a journalist has
taken the role of advocating in favor of a side in a conflict, we do not even know
whether he sincerely believes the position he has chosen to proliferate, and we see
preparedness to use any means possible to accomplish this. So, we may wonder,
why stop there? Why not fully engage the whole spectrum of one’s own imagination and play it out,13 particularly if there is not only no cost to oneself but even
prospects for (professional) glory.14
–––––––––––––
12

On the subject of respect for a person’s views see Edward Langerak, “Disagreement:
Appreciating the Dark Side of Tolerance,” in Philosophy, Religion, and the Question of Intolerance, Mehdi Amin Razavi and David Ambuel (eds.) (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1997), see particularly pages 118-20.
13
And, sure enough, as far as the Serbs’ “crimes” go, imagine they did. Witness, for
instance, the German defense minister Rudolf Scharping at work on 16 April, 1999: “it is recounted that the fetus was cut out of the body of a dead pregnant woman in order to roast it and
then put it back in the cut-open belly…that limbs and heads are systematically cut off, that
sometimes they play football with heads…” Quoted in Diana Johnstone, Fool’s Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2002), p. 252. But
there was no material evidence, then or now, for stories of this sort.
14
Consider, for example, Roy Gutman (Newsday reporter) the author of many excellent
examples of this sort of narrative including A Witness to Genocide that not only got him a
Pulitzer Prize, but also landed him a pseudo-governmental job as Senior Fellow at the U.S.
Institute of Peace. And there were others, John Burns (New York Times), David Rohde (Chris-
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Those engaged in the genocidalism of commission are on a similar mission of
proliferating blame for genocide through “education,” and cannot afford to be
choosy as to what they will present as evidence in their exciting endeavor to
“enhance understanding” about what “really” transpired in some far away place.
So, the question arises about what is the proper way to present historical episodes
of genocide.

2.3 Avoiding genocidalism by presenting
all dimensions of a genocide
When it comes to determining what would count as a proper discourse about
an episode of alleged genocide one must pay attention to all four dimensions of
genocide:
(i) Historical time and place of the pertinent events;
(ii) Perpetrators;
(iii) Victims; and
(iv) The number of people killed.
There is an ambiguity here in the notion of “number” invoked in the dimension
(iv). The number may mean the absolute number of people killed in an episode of
genocide; it may mean a percentage of the population lost as part of the total
number of people prior to the episode; or it may indicate the number that was
deemed sufficient to endanger collective survival of a group. The last notion, if
sufficiently fine-grained, and taking into account genocidal intent, should prove
most relevant for determinations of whether genocide occurred in the context of a
violent episode. So, such difficult questions would have to be entertained concerning whether a loss of, say, 20% of pre-war population is equally bad for a nation of
hundred million or for a nation of just seven million. What about a much smaller
percentage and absolute number of killed for a population that has become significantly impaired in the prospects of long-term survival? Since genocide—in its
broadly understood meaning, synonymous with extermination—is accomplished
and absolutely clear only when 100% of a given population is killed everything
else is attempted genocide, the question arises, “At what point can this attempt be
said to start?” These and similar vexing questions aside, what is clear is that the
number of people killed in a violent episode—whatever its proper understanding—
represents a very important dimension of genocide.
This dimension is crucially important not only for the purpose of appreciating
the impact of genocide as a practice, but also when it comes to understanding what
genocide really is, as well as for discerning where genocidalism of commission
goes wrong. Namely, without giving proper attention to this fourth dimension of
–––––––––––––

tian Science Monitor), and most recently Samantha Power [A Problem from Hell: America and
the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002)] got the Pulitzer for their works similarly
premised.
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genocide any claim that genocide took place in some social context amounts to
unequivocally attributing a specific intention to a group (or individual) on insufficient grounds, and constitutes irresponsible use of language. Furthermore, it stands
to reason that the ratio of people killed among those who count as victims, and
those who count as perpetrators in an episode of genocide must be such that the
former considerably outnumber the latter. (Without this one-sidedness we would
have an entirely new category of “crime,” which we may even call “mutual genocide,” however, it would be one with its own, very different, logic of normative
assessment than what we encounter when we consider genocide.) Of course, we
face again a similar puzzle over what should count as “considerable” in this context. We can take it as clear, however, that if the sides in a conflict suffer roughly
the same casualties, or the side that counts perpetrators suffers more killed than the
side that counts as victims in a pronounced episode of “genocide,” then this
criterion for genocide is not met and in the former case there cannot be talk of any
victims of genocide on one side while on the other there are the perpetrators while
obviously something has gone terribly wrong in the latter case.15
Let us consider on two examples (that we will come back to again later)—
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda—of how things, indeed, can go terribly wrong.
The standard figure that was widely used in the 1990s discourse on casualties
regarding the conflict in the former Yugoslav Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was the number of 200,000 Bosnian Muslim victims. However, the
only thorough study available in the 1990s suggests the range of 25,000 to 60,000
fatalities on all sides to the conflict.16 Robert Hayden makes an interesting point
about fatalities in Bosnia. He cites the estimates by “Bosnia’s State Health Protection Office,” an organ of Bosnian Muslim government, that 278,000 people were
killed or went missing in the period 1992-95: 140,800 Bosniaks (that is Muslims),
97,300 Serbs, and 28,400 Croats. If we took these numbers as the correct estimates
of the fatalities Hayden calculates that this would mean that the “ratio of casualties
to the prewar populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina of Muslims and Serbs are
almost the same: 7.4 percent of Muslims, 7.1 percent of Serbs.” He concludes,
rightly in our opinion: “This similarity of ratios would make it very hard to argue
that what took place in Bosnia was “genocide,” unless there were two genocides
there.” We take his invocation of “two genocides” as in fact a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that genocide took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 17
–––––––––––––

15
In Frank Chalk’s proposal for a redefinition of “genocide” the occurrence of the phrase
“one-sided mass killing” suggests agreement with this insight. He defines genocide as “a form
of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that
group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.” See Frank Chalk, “Redefining
Genocide” in George Andreopoulos, Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), p. 52.
16
See George Kenny, “The Bosnian Calculation,” New York Times, Sunday, 23 April 1995,
Section 6, Magazine, p. 42.
17
See Robert M. Hayden, “Shindler’s Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population
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PRÉFECTURE
(PROVINCE)

Byumba

POPULATION
IN 1994

NUMBER
OF
PEOPLE KILLED
All ethnic groups
From 1990 à 1995

PERCENTAGE OF
THE POPULATION
KILLED

845.000

470.000

56

1.250.000

360.000

29

Kibungo

700.000

349.000

50

Butare

830.000

330.000

40

Other prefectures

4.125.000

961.000

23

All prefectures

7.750.000

2.470.000

32

Kigali

Things are much worse in the case of Rwanda. The standard figure given in
the Western media about Rwanda is that some 800,000 Tutsi and “moderate Hutu”
died at the hands of “extremist” Hutu. However, more serious studies of the
distribution of casualties among conflicting groups during this episode of violence
paint a very different picture.18 After assembling available data and testimonies,
James K. Gasana19 estimates the number of victims of the Rwandan conflict (which
began in October 1990, with a war of aggression carried out from Uganda by the
Rwandan Patriotic Front, now in power) to close to 2.5 million, broken down as
follows (seetable above).
The total of 2, 470, 000 dead includes approximately 600, 000 Tutsi, killed by
civilians, and common law criminals of all kinds.20 The difference (2, 470.000–––––––––––––

Transfers,” Slavic Review, 55 (1996), pp. 746-7, note 65. It is worth mentioning here another
study commissioned by the Demographic Unit, Office of the Prosecutor International Criminal
Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia, Ewa Tabeau and Jakub Bijak, “Casualties of the 1990s War
in Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Critique of Previous Estimates and the Latest Results,” European
Journal of Population (forthcoming). This latest study further confirms the point we are
advocating here by estimating the number of casualties to be the total of 102,622 persons, of
which 55,261 were civilians and 47,360 militaries at the time of death.
18
“Our research strongly suggests that a majority of the victims were Hutus - there weren't
enough Tutsis in Rwanda at the time to account for all the reported deaths," Professor Davenport
said, who worked with an associate, Allan Stam, from Dartmouth College.” See “Rwanda 1994
killings weren't 'genocide': US study” as reported on March 4, 2004 by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation at:
http://www.abc.net.au/cgi-bin/common/printfriendly.pl?http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s1080562.htm.
19
James K Gasana, “La Violence politique au Rwanda 1991-1993,” (1998), Association
NOUER, Geneva/Brussels, 1998.
20
See “Genodynamics”, a study offered under the title “Mass Killing and the Oases of
Humanity: Understanding Rwandan Genocide and Resistance,” available at:
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/davenport/genodynamics/research.htm.

332

Социолошки преглед, vol. XXXX (2006), no. 3, стр. 323–346

600,000)= 1,870,000 represents Hutu victims of the conflict, many of whom were
murdered by RPF combatants.
These numbers suggest that the casualty rates between those who in the customary narratives count as victims and perpetrators are roughly equal in the case of
the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina while, absurdly, the killed among the
“perpetrators” outnumber by three times those of the “victims” in Rwanda. Yet, we
continue to hear just the old numbers. The continued uncritical use of the old numbers about conflicts in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, clearly, represent an attempt at a “nazification” of the Serbs and Hutu as peoples. But the real outcome, albeit
perhaps unintended, may in fact be the “de-nazification” of the Nazi. What is more,
however, to the extent that genocidalists through their narratives in effect “deNazify” the Nazi, they in fact ultimately “Nazify” themselves!21 A cynic might
observe that even in this day and age one can be essentially like a Nazi and enjoy
it, but only when the ideological targeting is properly directed under the cover of
geopolitically guided “political correctness.”

3. International Criminal Law and Genocidalism
3.1 Genocide
According to Article II of the Genocide Convention, “genocide means any of
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”
Consequently, for a situation to fit the definition of genocide, three essential
elements are necessary: (i) an identifiable national, ethnic, racial or religious group;
(ii) the intent to destroy such a group in whole or in part (mens rea); and (iii) the
commission of any of the listed acts, (a)-(e), in conjunction with the identifiable
group (actus reus).
For a situation to be considered an instance of genocide there is no minimum
number of fatalities required. However, the intent to destroy a particular group in
whole or in part is probably accessible epistemically only when intent is associated
with mass crimes. Discussing whether the U.S. were guilty of genocide in Vietnam,
Jean-Paul Sartre correctly points out that the Genocide Convention “was tacitly
–––––––––––––
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This dialectic salto mortale is delightfully captured by Milan Brdar in his “Humanitarian
Intervention and the (De)Nazification Thesis as a Functional Simulacrum,” in Aleksandar Jokic
(ed.) Lessons of Kosovo: The Dangers of Humanitarian Intervention (Calgary: Broadview Press,
2003), pp. 153-71.

333

Aleksandar Jokic, Tiphaine Dickson, Globalization and Genocidalism

referring to memories which were still fresh,” that is to Adolf Hitler’s “proclaimed…intent to exterminate the Jews.”22 Sartre asserted the obvious, that not all governments would be as stupid as Adolf Hitler’s and proclaim such intentions as to
eliminate a people. The question then is, if the intent is not explicitly proclaimed
how is it discovered? Our contention would be that this process of discovery would
have something to do with the scale of killing and massive disproportion (onesidedness) of fatalities between the parties involved.

3.2 The impossibility of the primacy of international
law over domestic law
Genocidalism can, and indeed does, pose the greatest danger when deployed in
the legal arena. The consequences are real, as is arrest, “transfer,” detention,
conviction, and the stigma attached to charges—even unproven—of genocide,
whether against an individual, or against a collective. While it could be expected
that subjection of a litigious issue to competing advocates to establish legal and
factual truth23 would guarantee an objective and reliable process of discovery, this
expectation is only valid if the legal process in which the question is examined is
itself valid, that is, legally constituted, independent, impartial, and respectful of
evidentiary and procedural norms. The Security Council of the United Nations has
established two ad hoc bodies (in 1993 for the “former” Yugoslavia24, bearing the
acronym ICTY, and in 1994 for Rwanda, known as the ICTR) to which it has
afforded jurisdiction over the crime of genocide. Although we will not debate in
detail here the legality of the Security Council’s resolution, there is one element
that we think has great philosophical significance. It relates to the fact that while
the Tribunals remain subordinate to the Security Council, their statutes provide
them with primacy over national courts (including the authority to demand the
surrender of the accused). There is a paradox here, and it comes out quite clearly
when we generalize the question to “How is it possible that international law could
have primacy over national or domestic law?”
A complaint, not uncommon any more, that a specific domestic law of some
–––––––––––––

22
Discovering intent is not an easy matter, as the discussion, extensive investigation, and
analysis of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam shows. The so-called Russell Tribunal (the
International War Crimes Tribunal), which conducted its “trial” in the 1966-1967 in Stockholm
and Copenhagen, unanimously found the U.S. guilty of genocide in Vietnam. Others looked at
governmental statements (which, of course, never contained any admission of genocidal intent),
and even population statistics and health standards of the Vietnamese population, only to find
the allegation of genocide “grotesque” [See Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam New York:
Oxford University Press, (1978), pp. 301-04 (emphasis provided)].
23
See Susan Haack, “Truth, truths, “truth”, and “truths” in the law”, The Journal of Philosophy, Science and Law, Volume 3, 2003.
24
The ICTY asserted jurisdiction over alleged offences committed on Yugoslav territory—
namely, Kosovo, a province of Serbia—while Yugoslavia was not yet a “former” nation.
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country is inconsistent with international law (especially human rights law) is often
taken to render that domestic law somehow invalid (or morally unjustifiable). This
implies a view that might be expressed in the statement that international law,
strictly speaking, enjoys a primacy over domestic law. What sense could be made
of this? It follows that consistency with international law is a condition of validity
for domestic laws. Now this idea is either plainly mistaken or in need of clarification (in order to imply anything of real relevance in the world). It is mistaken in
the sense that per assumption domestic law has a clear source of validity, which
determines its relevance in a precise manner: it is a decision of some collective
about its own matters. It is in need of clarification, however, in the sense that it is
obscure how could something with a clear source of validity depend in any way on
something that is not clear what it is or whether it even exists. Hence, the assumption that the relevancy of domestic laws is conditional on their consistency with
international law does not appear at all legally applicable.
On the contrary, international law, whatever its final shape, must start from the
assumption that all applicable (domestic) laws have their relevance; that they
express certain social facts that are simply there. For, if the relevancy of specific
domestic laws were to be measured by their consistency with international law (or
whatever other supra-national basis), then this would be tantamount to treating all
domestic laws as irrelevant. Conditionality of the binding force of domestic law on
consistency with international law, which is something that cannot be known in
advance, would mean a question mark for every domestic law whether it is institutionally binding or not. Therefore, the enforcement of any domestic law may ex
post facto turn out to be, strictly speaking, illegal activity. Thus, the primacy of
international law, explicated along this lines, rendering it as the only law with
relevancy would, of course, be quite undesirable and dangerous. We doubt, however, that it is even possible to express this view in a coherent way because it
appears to be an absurdity. What is possible, however, is for a powerful state to
take the doctrine of the primacy of international law “seriously” as a ground for
pronouncing at will various laws in other countries as (domestically) non-binding.
There is great practical danger in this doctrine, for he whose judgment of (in)consistency counts, has the power over others. This same problem plagues the newly
established International Criminal Court (ICC), for the court theoretically would
take action only when national courts fail to fulfill their legal responsibilities. But
who determines a domestic system’s “ineffectiveness”?

3.3 Problems with the ICTY indicating that
it dispenses genocidalism
When Slobodan Milosevic was asked to plead to the indictment filed against
him, after being whisked off to The Hague as a result of a transfer whose legality
bore more resemblance to kidnapping for ransom than to extradition, his response
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to the ICTY Chamber was not the typical “Not guilty." Milosevic instead said:
"That is not my problem, that is your problem.”
And, indeed, the ICTY’s problem it became. When the prosecution rested its
case after the resignation of the Trial Chamber’s President, Richard May, in spring
2004, many in the media bemoaned the failure to prove genocide, and others were
unimpressed by the picture of confusion left by weak witnesses, deflated in crossexamination by a defendant who consistently stated the ICTY was not a legal, or
judicial, institution. Voices rose to express increasingly strident concern that the
trial was going off the rails. Expectations appeared not to have been met.
As the defence approached, and Milosevic announced that he would secure the
attendance of 1600 witnesses to support the case he announced he would make
from the beginning—namely that the “Balkan Wars” had in fact been one war,
against Yugoslavia, planned and carried out by Western powers, whose gruesome
apotheosis was NATO’s 78-day bombing campaign in 1999—the ICTY’s most
prestigious supporters zeroed in on the upcoming defence, arguing that Milosevic’s
right to represent himself had been granted “long enough.”
The media onslaught was, and remains, significant and raises an obvious
question: what is it about the present stage of the hearings that requires such collective effort to defeat?
The consistent, apparently genocidalist offensive seemed triggered by fear, and
not only challenged—and continues to challenge—the internationally mandated
right to self-representation (and the resulting freedom to present a true defence),
but was further calculated to prevent Milosevic from demonstrating the ICTY’s
illegality, and functions. Genocide apparently trumps fairness, and in particular the
rights of the accused, when the exercise of those rights challenges the genocide
narrative. President Milosevic has indeed consistently argued that the ICTY serves
up apologia for the destruction of Yugoslavia, provides justification for aggression,
and rewrites history. Hence, the seemingly endless references, not to Milosevic’s
health, but to his deleterious impact on the “Court’s reputation,” “credibility” and
“legitimacy.”
Writing in the pages of International Herald Tribune25, David Scheffer, former
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues under former U.S. Secretary of State
Albright, dehumanized Milosevic, and urged the ICTY to reassert its “authority”
over him. Wrote Scheffer: “When he was the presiding judge, the late Richard May
deftly handled Milosevic’s exercise of his right to self-representation by giving him
enough leash every day to speak his mind and then jerking that leash when he
overstepped his bounds.” The metaphor of “leash jerking” was powerfully deployed in light of the painfully recent Abu Ghraib prison atrocities in Iraq, immortalized by the infamous photograph of Pfc. Lynndie England holding a naked human
being on a leash. Was Scheffer urging the ICTY to become more like Abu Ghraib,
–––––––––––––
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2004.
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but in the judicial, rather than military theatre of operations? Whatever his intent,
in one important respect there is hardly any difference between the physical and
metaphorical leash jerking: they are both firmly grounded in the most primitive
racist or reifying attitudes toward their targets. And who exactly was the target of
David Scheffer’s comments? It would appear to be only Mr. Milosevic who is thus
rendered inhuman, but there is another, even more crucial objective: the ICTY’s
judges and prosecutor are implicitly reminded here that they are mere tools (res) of
the Empire, so they had better deliver.
And what were the goods to be delivered by the ICTY? The process is staggeringly costly, so it follows that a conviction is necessary, and that “justice”
mandates the gagging of Milosevic, who is: “charged with crimes of enormous
gravity in the Balkans: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. They
scream out for accountability. The United Nations and its member states are
expending large sums of money on these trials for the purpose of justice, not political diatribes and meandering defences.” It is unclear whether this is a legal or
political argument. It may be that Scheffer’s position—promoting a novel legal
approach—is that since Milosevic has been charged with the most serious crimes
of all, and that they “scream out for accountability,” this very fact ipso facto constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt of his actual guilt. For who could imagine that
the ICTY might bring frivolous charges and indict a sitting President in the midst
of a war of aggression against his country? Alternatively, Scheffer’s words might
be expressing a direct political claim: “We paid for this, and we certainly did not
pay for this man to jerk us around.”
Scheffer advocates the imposition of counsel, to: “ensure the integrity of the
process, which may be nearing a breaking point with the international community.”
The impatience expressed on behalf of the phantom “international community”
might in fact be just Scheffer’s own and those of his ilk, well connected to the
establishment of the ICTY. In any event, the point is that the ICTY has no legal
authority beyond the powers granted by the Security Council, and deemed legally
valid by its own appeals chamber, i.e., itself. Hence, its authority “must be asserted.” The very process, which is an abuse, must be protected from “a crippling
abuse,” that is, from denunciation by Milosevic, and in particular his witnesses: “A
massive criminal enterprise of this character deserves a long, carefully developed
trial that inevitably will experience delays. That is the nature of the beast. But the
time has arrived to reassert the court’s mandated authority and prevent a crippling
abuse of the process by the likes of Slobodan Milosevic.” “Nature of the beast,”
indeed. It is urgent that this be accomplished since the ICTY, as opposed to judicial
bodies the world over, is a “limited engagement,” and is attempting to complete
investigations, trials, and appeals before a Security Council-mandated deadline—
known as the “completion strategy”—in 2010. A conviction must be secured before then. Just as performances must end before the circus can leave town.
Also urgent is that “Serbs,” specifically, “respect the court’s authority,” and
presumably this transformation can only take place if Milosevic is gagged, and the
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illegality of the body never mentioned again: “Perhaps if the discipline of a
competent counsel is brought into the courtroom, Milosevic’s Serb supporters
would learn to respect the authority of this tribunal.”
In his conclusion Scheffer fittingly returned, in true genocidalist form, to his
tired leash metaphor to reinforce his point that Milosevic must be silenced
“permanently” since he is inhuman: “Milosevic has jerked the court around long
enough. It is time to permanently pull in Judge May’s well-worn leash.”
And if Scheffer’s abuse of the genocide discourse to dehumanize a defendant
and publicly lobby for the violation of human rights wasn’t enough of an illustration of the impunity afforded to genocidalism in the legal arena, Michael Scharf,
visiting professor of law at Case Western Reserve University, and instrumental in
the creation of the ICTY, followed Scheffer’s opening salvo in the Washington
Post, and, with bone-chilling clarity, made the case for imposition, employing
strikingly political arguments.26 Drawing on the now-familiar refrain that Slobodan
Milosevic is “playing for the home audience,” Scharf was outraged by the idea that
the unrepresented defendant would somehow make use of a show trial to gain
support in Serbia and Montenegro, when the ICTY was created, he deadpanned,
precisely to remove Milosevic from politics, and “educate” Serbs, so that he and
his like would be put out of commission forever. That his own argument confirms
the political nature of the ICTY and candidly clarifies its objectives as non-judicial
does not deter Scharf from the description of the process as an “international war
crimes trial” and the institution as a “court of law.”
According to Scharf: “Milosevic’s caustic defence strategy is unlikely to win
him acquittal, but it isn’t aimed at the court of law in The Hague. His audience is
the court of public opinion back home in Serbia, where the trial is a top-rated TV
show and Milosevic’s standing continues to rise. Opinion polls have reported that
75 percent of Serbs do not feel that Milosevic is getting a fair trial, and 67 percent
think that he is not responsible for any war crimes. ‘Slobo Hero!’ graffiti is
omnipresent on Belgrade buses and buildings. Last December, he easily won a seat
in the Serbian parliament in a national election.”
What any of these concerns and political trivia could possibly have to do with
international law—if considered as an activity of a judicial nature—is unclear. If,
however, playing to an uninformed Western public, the idea is to suggest that by
granting basic internationally recognized human rights to the man who was the
West’s principal interlocutor in Balkan peace negotiations for over half a decade,
the ICTY is failing in its mission to “educate” the Serbs, then the point is well
taken. Scharf deplores the fact that opinion polls show that “75% of Serbs do not
feel Milosevic is getting a fair trial.” Scharf’s disappointment in this expression of
popular distrust—which may well be directed to the institution as a whole—assumes that public opinion in Serbia and Montenegro is misguided, and that it fails to
–––––––––––––
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Michael Scharf, "Making a Spectacle of Himself: Milosevic Wants a Stage, Not the
Right to Provide His Own Defense", Washington Post, August 29th, 2004.
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appreciate the “fairness” of the proceedings. But if, as Scharf claims, ICTY hearings are “top rated” TV shows, then public opinion was formed by actually observing the proceedings; in which case the problem might not be collective delusion
abroad, but rather Western ignorance of the ICTY’s day to day workings. The latter
are largely inconsistent with the widely held Western belief—based, perhaps, on
faith or missionary zeal—that proceedings in The Hague are inherently fair.
Scharf’s preoccupation with graffiti adorning the buses and buildings of
Belgrade is perhaps an expression of concern for the environment. However, any
threat posed by ‘Slobo Hero!’ pales in comparison to the effects of NATO’s
bombing, and in particular, with the presence of depleted uranium in the soil and
groundwater of Serbia and Montenegro. It may be that “Serb” public opinion has
not yet been sufficiently educated by the “court of law” to lose sight of this disturbing reality, which will remain with it for decades, and possibly centuries. Perhaps
this reality and the ever-present reminders of NATO’s bombing in the streets of
Belgrade have had some influence on the public perception of the ICTY’s “fairness.”27 Or perhaps the massive privatizations forced upon Serbia and Montenegro,
as well as the sudden staggering increase in unemployment and the impoverishments that came in the wake of the nation’s new, post-Yugoslav “openness,” fail to
inspire the majority of people struggling for survival, with global anything, much
less “global justice,” which after all, was largely responsible for triggering the first
aerial bombing of Belgrade since World War II.
In an eloquent illustration of how the genocidalist discourse permits dizzying
contortions of logic, all justified (or promoted) by some article of faith, Scharf
makes plain that the ICTY was created for political reasons, yet advocates
imposing counsel on Slobodan Milosevic to prevent him from making precisely the
same point. The only difference is that Milosevic is “disparaging,” while Scharf
argues that the ICTY’s evident political objectives are somehow valid:
“In creating the Yugoslavia tribunal statute, the U.N. Security Council set three
objectives: first, to educate the Serbian people, who were long misled by Milosevic’s
propaganda, about the acts of aggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed by his regime; second, to facilitate national reconciliation by pinning prime
responsibility on Milosevic and other top leaders and disclosing the ways in which the
Milosevic regime had induced ordinary Serbs to commit atrocities; and third, to
promote political catharsis while enabling Serbia’s newly elected leaders to distance
–––––––––––––
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The ICTY refused to consider NATO's 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia as a crime.
Passenger trains were struck by so-called smart bombs, as was the RTS public television station,
numerous villages, farms, civilian infrastructure, places of worship, and more importantly
civilians – аctual people – men, women and children. There were surprisingly few military
targets in this gruesome 78-day bombing. The environment was polluted for centuries with
depleted uranium. Smart bombs were so smart that they appeared to make foreign policy
decisions, and thereby struck the Chinese Embassy. President Milosevic's bedroom was bombed,
a naked assassination attempt in complete violation of international law.
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themselves from the repressive policies of the past. May’s decision to allow Milosevic
to represent himself has seriously undercut these aims.”

The idea that affording the right of self-representation to Milosevic had
“seriously undercut” the “aims” of the ICTY’s very establishment strains credulity.
However, if those aims were, and continue to be, “to pin” responsibility on Slobodan Milosevic, and to “educate” Serbs about how bad he was—or, ultimately, how
bad Yugoslavia was—then these aims are assuredly not shared by the defendant.
Indeed, Milosevic has no intention of assisting the ICTY in “convincing Serbs”
that acts of aggression committed against Yugoslavia were justified. Furthermore,
whether or not the political aims set out by Scharf are valid, morally correct, or
politically expedient, they cannot make legal what is illegal, they cannot make
legitimate what is illegitimate, and they cannot, most crucially, turn a political
body into a court.

3.4 Rwanda’s mind-numbing genocidalism,
and selective jurisdiction
While the massacres that took place in Rwanda from April to July, 1994 were
undoubtedly a historical tragedy, little is known, it seems, of that nation’s war—a
war of aggression—which began on October, 1990, when Rwanda was the object
of an invasion from Uganda, by Ugandan officers, with Ugandan materiel and
weapons, led by a commander being trained in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, precisely at the moment the IMF was clamping down on the country’s developing economy, and when the international coffee markets—Rwanda’s principal export—
were crashing28. A few months earlier, French President Mitterrand had stepped up
the rhetoric of democratization, and demanded its francophone “partners” in Africa
move towards multipartism29. Thus, a tiny, mostly rural nation, debilitated by the
economic pressures of the promise of globalization, endured the horror of war,
replete with nightmarish massacres of the civilian population30, until it entered into
the Arusha Peace Accords, which were to install a “broad-based transitional
government” and eventually see democratic, multiparty elections, with a UN
peacekeeping force to help the nation along the path to peace and recovery. This
force was UNAMIR, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda, whose
force commander was Canadian general Romeo Dallaire, now a Carr Fellow at
–––––––––––––
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See Michael Chossudovsky “The US was Behind the Rwandan Genocide: Installing a
US Protectorate in Central Africa,” at: http://www.globalreasearch.ca/articles/CHO305A.html.
29
Barrie Collins “New Wars and Old Wars? The Lessons of Rwanda,” in David Chandler
(ed.) Rethinking Human Rights : Critical Approaches to International Politics (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan 2003) 157—75.
30
See testimony of Abdul Ruzibiza, a former RPF officer detailing the RPF’s crimes
against the civilian population at: http://www.inshuti.org/ruzibiza.htm.
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Harvard, and an ardent advocate of intervention in the Darfur region of Sudan,31
where he has proposed that “special units” could “eliminate or incarcerate” (in that
order?) those “presumed responsible”32 for committing acts of genocide. Humanitarian intervention seems to have evolved from apparently indiscriminate aerial
bombing (Yugoslavia) to good, old-fashioned death squads, and while the refinement in technique should perhaps be welcomed, the utter lack of interest in whether
genocide was or was not committed in Darfur before the “elimination” or “incarceration” (in whatever order) take place really ought, putting it very mildly, give
pause. But as we have seen, the genocide discourse hardly requires logic, and
appears to shrug off epistemology as some boring, outdated requirement applicable
only to academic eggheads and defense lawyers (if at all).
On April 6th, 1994, the plane carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi
back from a peace conference in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, was shot down by two
SAM-16 missiles on its approach to Grégoire Kayibanda International Airport,
killing all aboard: the presidents of two countries barely maintaining a fragile
peace, the chief of staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces, close advisors to the
presidents, and a French crew. Any (perhaps delusional) idea of peace had instantly
vanished, and as armed conflict resumed, the killings began.
The shooting down of the President's plane, considered by all, including the
UN Special Rapporteur on Rwanda33 the proximate cause of the massacres, had
been under investigation several years ago, but it was shut down, personally, by
then-Prosecutor, Louise Arbour, who is now High Commissioner for Human
Rights of the United Nations.34 The ICTR investigation had revealed that those
responsible for shooting down the plane were in fact those currently in power—the
Rwandan Patriotic Front, led by Major-General Paul Kagame—with the assistance
of a foreign country.35 And when defense counsel sought to obtain the results of
those investigations, or attempted to ascertain whether they were even taking place,
–––––––––––––
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See his New York Times op-ed “Looking at Darfur, Seeing Rwanda” of October 4, 2004
at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/04/opinion/04dallaire.html?ex=1097902196&ei=1&en=7ce95
59173ae8940.
32
Both ad hoc Security Council tribunals are, by their official titles, tribunals for the
prosecution of those “presumed responsible” of grave violations of humanitarian law. Both, in
an apparent paradox, guarantee the presumption of innocence.
33
See report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr. R. Degni-Ségui,
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, under paragraph 20 of Commission
resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of 25 May 1994 available at: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/commission/country51/7.htm.
34
See Robin Philpot “Nobody Can Call It a ‘Plane Crash’ Now! Judge Bruguière's Report
on the Assassination of former Rwandan President Habyarimana,” Counterpunch March 12/14,
2004: http://www.counterpunch.org/philpot03122004.html.
35
Steven Edwards “Explosive Leak on Rwanda Genocide,” National Post, (Toronto),
March 1st, 2000, page 1.
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the Prosecution boldly claimed that there were none, nor were any required, as the
ICTR had no interest, and indeed no jurisdiction, to investigate “plane crashes” or
the deaths of “presidents or vice-presidents.”36 The investigation was terminated
shortly after that motion was argued in the Rutaganda case.37 This is a fascinating
illustration of genocidalism’s double standard, its moralité à géométrie variable38,
as the practice is just as capable of retreating rapidly into disingenuous claims of
“lack of jurisdiction” (when pretty serious crimes really ought to be investigated)
as it is of quasi-tentacular reach into an ever-increasing number of conflicts39 and
issues40 framed as genocide.
According to the Nuremberg Tribunal, “To initiate a war of aggression is not
only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only
from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the
whole.”41 Neither of the UN ad hoc Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia—created without recourse to treaty, or to the General Assembly, and in blithe disregard
for the UN Charter’s apparently platudinous orthodoxies of a bygone era, such as
respect for national sovereignty and a Security Council limited to jurisdiction over
peace and security, not international circuit courts—consider aggression within
their jurisdiction. In fact, they provide cover and justification for wars of aggression and contribute to the creation of conditions that actually increase the incidence
of crime (including crimes against Humanity and rape, for starters) such as war,
lawlessness, dehumanization, and the immiseration of men, women and children.
The ICTR does not consider the militarily victorious (with the help, perhaps,
of the US, who succeeded in reducing the UN peacekeeping force to a symbolic
presence42) RPF's 1996 invasion of the Congo—with reported massacres of tens of
thousands of Hutu refugees and Congolese civilians43, nor Rwanda's bloody 1998
reinvasion of Congo, which degenerated, at one point, into a war involving 8
–––––––––––––
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Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR 96-3-T, transcripts, February 7th, 1997, pp. 44-5.
37
Id.
38
For an excellent analysis of this aspect of the phenomenon see Edward S. Herman “The
Cruise Missile Left (Part 5): Samantha Power and the Genocide Gambit,” May 17, 2004 available at: http://musictravel.free.fr/political/political49.htm.
39
See, for example, Gajendra K. Singh “New Bush Era Begins,” South Asian Analysis
Group, paper no. 1174 available at: http://www.saag.org/papers12/paper1174.html.
40
See, for example, Gregg Cunningham “Why Abortion is Genocide?” a publication of
something called The Center for Bio-Ethical Reform available at: http://abortionno.org/Resources/abortion.html.
41
Nuremberg Tribunal Judgment, (IMT, Goering et al.), 1946, p. 26.
42
Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away With Murder: Illegal Wars, Collateral
Damage, and Crimes Against Humanity, (London-Ann Arbor, Pluto Press, 2004) p. 105.
43
Id: “America has provided military aid for the Rwanda regime’s participation since 1996
in the Congo war, which has benefited so many North American mining interests and taken
millions of lives.”
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African countries, and which has been responsible for the death of at least 5 million
people, according to conservative sources such as the International Committee for
Refugees.44 The ICTR instead greatly contributes to the justification of Rwandan
aggression abroad (and repression at home) by consecrating a “victim” status for
the current military leadership, and collectively demonizes the Hutu as “génocidaires”.
Courts who consider the gravity of an offence based on the identity of the
victim are not carrying out justice; they are promoting injustice as they create
conditions of impunity for the crimes committed against the victims they exclude.
Furthermore, can it be justice when the nature of actions depends on the identity of
an alleged perpetrator? Accounts of Serb “rape camps” in Bosnia and Herzegovina
are “genocidal”. Saddam’s “rape rooms” justify invasion and occupation. Yet rapes
of boys, committed in front of their parents by US troops and private contractors at
Abu Ghraib warrant impunity. It is fair to say that that is not justice, but a
perversion of justice.
During the September 30th US Presidential debate, George W. Bush stated that
he would not join the International Criminal Court where “unaccountable judges
and prosecutors can pull our troops or diplomats up for trial”45, adding that such a
practice would be contrary to the national interest. It is obviously (to us, at least)
not in anybody’s interest to be tried before unaccountable judges. But it would
appear that it is in the US national interest that other people, lesser people, are thus
prosecuted.
The US national interest is in diminishing—eliminating ultimately—everyone
else's national sovereignty. And one of the means to achieve that interest is by
establishing these non-democratic Tribunals, and manipulating the concept of
genocide to attain legitimacy. The Tribunals bully, coerce, and blackmail recalcitrant nations with bogus indictments, and create instant versions of history to
further destabilize its colonies. And the US interest is in securing impunity for
itself, as well as its clients, for the crime of aggression, which is frequently required in the pursuit of its goal: the destruction of national sovereignty. Genocidalism,
to paraphrase Michael Mandel (on the “punitive vision of international human
rights”), looks a lot like “globalized American law-and-order politics, like music
videos and jeans: what they used to call the ‘Coca-colonization’ of the world”.46
That is not international or UN justice, that is imperialism.

4. Conclusion
–––––––––––––
44

On the “conservative” estimates of 5 million dead in Congo, it seems the International
Refugee Committee has brought it down to 3.3 million:www.refintl.org/content/article/detail971.
45
See the debate transcript at: http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004a.html.
46
Mandel, p. 249.
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There are two results of our discussion that should be emphasized in the
concluding remarks. The first result exposes what might be described as a huge
normative divide between ways of attending to domestic (or national) concerns and
ways of attending to international issues characteristic of Western democracies.
Often what is clearly wrong, even criminalized on the domestic (national) level
seems all right, even encouraged when it is practiced with respect to international
affairs. The second outcome is the recognition that there exists a need for proper
institutionalization of protection against harms (individual and collective) that genocidalism of commission inflicts on its targets.
It looks to us that globalization is the globalization of US sovereignty, i.e., its
extension over as much foreign territory as possible. And genocidalism is a means
to that end, more effective than, say, weapons of mass destruction, or even “terrorism” as a tool.47 Genocidalism is so effective that it bars the inherent right to selfdefense against aggression, and obviates the sovereignty of the targeted state.
Genocidalism can even be employed to actually make states vanish, in what can
only be called republicide. Genocidalism—so far, tragically—means never having
to say you’re sorry. The claim simply sticks, no matter what, as fiction is elevated
above truth in the public discourse, whether the general public discourse, the media
discourse, the academic discourse, and increasingly, the judicial discourse.
Determining the existence of facts (in law) involves a certain methodology
that increases the chances that what is being established will also be reliable and
relevant. Fiction’s methodology is not even important, but its effect—the ability to
create emotion, seems more appealing to more and more “thinkers” (who should
logically be renamed “feelers”).48 When genocidalism is employed to advance foreign policy aims, in particular territorial ones, the debunking of the genocide
claim, while possible, is entirely ineffective, and in any event does not influence
the “facts on the ground,” such as Camp Bondsteel in the occupied province of
Serbia, Kosovo and Metohija, or NATO's continued presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
–––––––––––––

47
However, when WMD fails, just use “democracy”—you're already occupying the
country, so why not give the uncivilized some “democracy” for their troubles, and call it even?
Even pretend to throw a bone to those on the Left-fake appeasement for the fake peace crowd–
and comfort their delusion that somehow they succeeded in their efforts to Bring Home the
Troops, Now! and give Iraq the great democracy of America, which far too many of these
people invoke as a reason America should just live up to its ideals and do more good-like
President Clinton did for Sudan, Rwanda and Yugoslavia – and less evil – like Bush and
Afghanistan, Iraq, and whoever is next on the target list.
48
On this most alarming trend, it is interesting to note that the American Society for
International Law published academic and State Department insider Michael Scharf’s reference
to what an ICTY judge was “feeling” when he issued a decision. Jurists should be serious, and
be interested in rules of evidence, but where genocide claims are involved, feelings appear to
carry more weight. See, “ICTY Appeals Chamber Decision of Slobodan Milosevic's Right to
Self Representation", November 2004; www.asil.org/2004/11/insight041111.html
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Although the act of genocide can be disproved, it is much more difficult to
remove the feeling of Genocide, and therefore the necessity of intervention, and its
subsequent justification.49 It may not be genocide, but it sure feels like it, therefore
if (what I’m feeling) isn’t genocide, then I don’t know what is! And that creates a
belief, unshakable, in a “reality,” although the holder of the belief might even know
it to be factually false. So what! The genocidalists, now practically artists, seem to
be having fun deploying their craft. If that is the case, then they are not morally
better than the sociopaths who take pleasure in torturing their victims.
This is why we believe that once the nature of genocidalism of commission is
truly appreciated, that is, once it becomes a properly understood, and well-researched social phenomenon, it should become recognized as a criminal act. And the
sentences should be very stiff indeed.

Aleksandar Jokic
Tiphaine Dickson
Portland State University
Portland, Oregon

Summary

ГЛОБАЛИЗАЦИЈА И ГЕНОЦИДАЛИЗАМ:
БЕЗГРАНИЧНИ ФИКЦИОНИ ДИСКУРС
(ЗА ЗАБАВУ И ПРОФИТ)
У овом есеју аутори истражују однос између глобализације и геноцидализма.
“Глобализација” је схваћена као “слобода и способност индивидуа и фирми да иницирају добровољне економске трансакције са становницима других земаља”, док
“геноцидализам” дефинишу као “(i) сврховито занемаривање или приписивање одговорности за геноцид у случајевима када постоји обимна евиденција; (ii) упорно
приписивање “геноцида” у нејасним случајевима без узимања у обзир расположиве и
уверљиве евиденције и аргументације.
Аутори бране хипотезу да се напад на концепт суверенитета националне државе
(свих држава изузев САД) и агресивна промоција интервенционизма, нарочито
“хуманитарне” интервенције, може приписати утицају једино преостале суперсиле. О
томе посебно сведочи друштвено-политички феномен “геноцидализма”. Овај се
манифестује као оруђе глобализације која показује карактеристике империјализма и
неоколонијализма а делује попут успешног Тројанског коња у правном смислу.
У глобализацији је према ауторима реч о глобализованју суверенитета САД, то
јест,реч је о њиховом ширењу на што више иностраних земаља. Геноцидализам је
–––––––––––––

49
Thus we can only agree with the claims in Dale Jamieson “Duties to the Distant: Aid,
Assistance, and Intervention in the Developing World,” The Journal of Ethics 9, No. 1-2 (2005):
151-71. Jamieson argues that “humanitarian” interventions (i.e., wars of aggression ostensibly
“justified” in the name of protecting and promoting “human rights”) usually serve various
imperial projects of the U.S.
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средство које служи у ту сврху а које је често успешније од оружја за масовно
уништење и од “тероризма”. Генецодализам је успешан зато што се ослања на право
самоодбране у чије име оспорава сувреренитет одређене земље. Он може да буде
употребљен за унишзење читавих држава, као што је било у случају Југославије или
Руанде.
Кључне речи: глобализација, геноцид, геноцидализам, агресија, међународно
право, међународни трибунал. Југославија, Рунада.
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